The Sahrawi are a hybrid people found in parts of northwest Africa,
Introduction
Western Sahara is an international anomaly suffering from multiple colonialist effects. Its people, the Sahrawi, have been struggling to get accepted in the community of nations from 1976. This has proved difficult despite expressions of sympathy.
In that struggle for acceptance, they initially appeared confused as to their identity, Spain decided to make its presence felt on the ground by directing human and material investments to the territory. It increased budgetary allocations, built infrastructure, put up schools, and encouraged investments in mineral exploration, particularly oil and iron.
Most important, the production of phosphate at Bu Craa was started and a 62 mile conveyor belt was built to deliver the phosphate to a port near Al-Ayoun from where it would be sent to Spain. Nature helped in the sedentarisation because drought hit the area, killed many livestock, and made people desperate to find alternative livelihood in growing little towns. All these activities brought the different Sahrawi clans into close contacts with each other and with the Spaniards. They interacted through residence, 
Sahrawi Anti-Colonialism
With diverse experiences, and influenced by political developments in the neighbouring French colonies, the Sahrawi in Western Sahara started demanding independence.
Administrative and political institutions designed to entrench Spanish rule in which the Sahrawi were treated as 'little brothers', 21 provided opportunity for Sahrawi to think in terms of a Western Sahara geopolitical entity that was different from its neighbours.
While their neighbours, having received French colonial experience had become independent, the Sahrawi colonial experience was Spanish and they were not independent. Together, they initially wanted to be involved in matters of the "province", and then evolved into an anti-colonial movement demanding independence.
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The first serious group to mount urban challenge to Spanish control in the 1960s was 37 Omar, "The Right of Self-Determination," pp. [48] [49] Peoples stressing that "all peoples have a right to self-determination" and the right to choose freely their own economic and political future. 43 While they all agreed on the need for speedy decolonization, they were divided on the direction that self-determination was to take when there were conflicting claims of rights. They particularly disagreed on the adjustment of colonial boundaries. Some countries displayed irredentist tendencies, Morocco amongst them, and claimed to be "progressive" while coveting land in other states. They called for abolition of colonial boundaries to suit real African interests as opposed to those of colonialists who had determined them. Opposed to them were those, mainly potential victims of irredentism, insisting on the sanctity of colonial boundaries, unfair as they may have been, in order to avoid chaos and possible bloodshed.
This had been the situation in May 1963 when heads of state and governments of independent African states met in Addis Ababa to found the Organization of African Unity. They agreed to uphold the sanctity of colonial boundaries and that the right of selfdetermination was to be within colonial borders. 44 They also agreed not to interfere with the internal affairs of member states. These provisions appear to have been aimed at the "progressive" states that were seemingly guilty of trying to violate the boundaries and of interfering with the internal affairs of member states. The OAU, however, did create a Liberation Committee to promote the liberation of the remaining colonies.
The Liberation Committee first met in July 1963 and seemed unsure on how to treat tiny colonies, implying concessions to irredentists. It sought to categorize colonial powers and colonies in terms of amenability to decolonization as well as viability of the entities to be decolonized. Spain, along with Britain and France, was described as a country that although it recognized the right of self-determination, it needed diplomatic pressure to make it accelerate decolonization. It also tended to defer decisions on the plight of small 
The UN Position
While the OAU was initially reluctant to engage Spain on the Western Sahara, the United Nations was not. In December 1960 the United Nation General Assembly had had passed
Resolution 1514(XV) on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples stating that "all peoples have a right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." 46 Resolution 1514 also prohibited any "attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country." 47 The UN followed this in 1961 by creating a watchdog Special
Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples giving the UN special presence in the final stages of decolonization in any territory. 48 In September 1963, it specified Western Sahara as a territory affected by Resolution 1514 and in 1964 went on to complain about Spain's reluctance to implement UN wishes. The General Assembly, in 1965, went on to request Spain to do everything possible to decolonize Western Sahara and to hold a referendum on self-determination. 49 Madrid became increasingly intransigent with claims that Western Sahara was a province of Spain, not subject to self-determination 50 with Mauritania, keeping Rio De Oro and Morocco taking Saguiet el-Hamra. 53 To thwart the expected referendum, supported by Mauritania, he suggested that the international court be asked to decide the ownership of Western Sahara. It was a delay tactic which, a disgusted Kenyan delegate Frank Njenga asserted was tantamount to asking the UN to treat the Sahrawi "as chattels and not as people." And the debates in the UN before authorizing referring Western Sahara to the international court made clear that its action did not mean negating the right of self-determination. 54 The matter was referred to the ICJ which in October 1975 issued its verdict saying that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had sovereignty over Western Sahara and that the Sahrawi had a right to self- 51 Ibid., pp. 702-706; Naylor, "Spain, France, and the Western Sahara," p. 23 52 Omar, " The Right to Self-Determination," p. 44 53 Knapp, North West Africa, p. 337; Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa, p.52 54 Franck, "The Stealing of the Sahara," pp. [705] [706] [707] determination. In addition, a UN inspection team found that most people wanted independence and supported POLISARIO. 55 Although disappointed, and knowing he had the support of the United States and France,
Hassan properly gauged that Spain could be manipulated partly because of the dying Franco. He then declared his intention to invade Western Sahara with an army of 350,000
pilgrims holding the Holy Koran to claim the territory. Although he violated an October 1970 UN Resolution that prohibited using force or threats of force to acquire territories, 56 he succeeded in creating tension to force things his way. With the United States and
France at the Security Council protecting Morocco, the UN was incapacitated and failed to condemn Moroccan invasion. 57 France and the United States preferred to have
Morocco grab the territory than have a revolutionary group replace Spain. To get its way, Morocco had developed capacity to manipulate, to its advantage, bigger powers than it was. It had already proven ability to juggle the big powers in the "war of the sands", one of whose peculiarities had been the balancing of Washington and 
